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CBW CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. Edited by Steven
Rose. Boston: Beacon Press. 1969. Pp. 209. $7.50.
Except for the probable but unproven use of poison gas by the
Egyptians in Yemen during 1963,' the United States is the only
country to use chemical weapons since World War .2 True, the
weapons used were officially classed as nontoxic, but when they are
applied to underground bunkers in high concentration or used in
conjunction with conventional weapons to kill troops, the classifi-
cations tend to blur. Further, America has not limited its use of
CBW agents to antipersonnel weapons. The employment of defoli-
ants in Vietnam represents a lethal CBW tactic which is directly in-
jurious to the civilian population, for the toxic effect is not limited to
jungle growth, but also results in the destruction of food crops
and/or the poisoning of the food consumer.
Sixty-three nations, including the USSR and the People's Repub-
lic of China, have signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which pro-
hibits "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and
all analogous liquids, materials or devices." 3 The United States has
never signed the protocol, and as this timely book points out, our
official policy as to the use of such weapons vacillates. President
Roosevelt renounced the first use of CBW weapons in 1943, yet
the Pentagon and State Department refused to endorse a similarly
worded declaration in 1960.' In recent years the White House
position has been that the use of "nontoxic" antipersonnel gas or
defoliants does not require a presidential order; rather, it is a de-
cision which can be made by commanders in the field. Whether
the use of these "nontoxic" substances is proscribed by the body of
international law governing chemical and biological weapons is
debatable, but most non-Americans versed in international law con-
tend that such activity is forbidden. Nevertheless, America's na-
tional CBW policy continues to evolve by default, with little dis-
cussion or public debate by those who create that policy, the elected
officials.
Recently, President Nixon first renounced the use of chemical
1 CBW CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 99 (S. Rose ed. 1969).
2 Id. at 87.
3 Id. at 143.
4 id. at 127.
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weapons, and then totally repudiated offensive use of biological
weapons. Those who are concerned with the preservation of life
as we now know it can only hope that the presidential statement
portends a cessation of America's current practice of ecocide (eco-
logical murder) in Vietnam. To date, more than 4 million acres
have been defoliated, with nearly another half million acres of
crops destroyed.5 No one knows what the ecological effect of this
will be,' but it seems most ironic that while we ban the sale of Coho
Salmon from Lake Erie because it contains 20 parts per million of
DDT, we continue to dump millions of gallons of herbicides on
Vietnam. Hopefully the President will demonstrate the depth of
his conviction by ordering the destruction of our stockpile of biolog-
ical weapons. Even those persons who are not appalled by CBW
agents' ghastly destructive potential should rejoice, for the President
has renounced the use of a weapon which is of doubtful military
value. Because their incidence is largely controlled by atmospheric
conditions, biological weapons are unpredictable in effect, often
presenting an equal threat to friend and foe alike.
While radioactivity is a much more precise and predictable way
of inflicting mass death, to provide a second strike capability
chemical weapon research and development programs will probably
be continued. The defensive and offensive aspects of biological
warfare are interdependent, and, therefore, the research effort may
well continue to produce an endless succession of intramural thrusts
and parries. The program is inherently self-perpetuating, for the
discovery of each new offensive agent necessitates the development
of a defensive antitoxin, which, in turn, invites the development
of a new lethal offensive agent.7 This means that while the national
policy may limit or eliminate the stockpiling of agents, a significant
portion of the program will continue.
These and other problems were considered in 1968 by an inter-
national group of scholars meeting in London. Their papers were
edited into CBW Chemical and Biological Watfare in the hope that
the spread of factual knowledge about the nature and menace of
these weapons would both precipitate their elimination and en-
courage complete disarmament. The book details the nature of
these weapons, their use by the United States and Egypt, the research
policies of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet
5 Id. at 64.
6 Harvey & Mann, Picloram in Vietnam, 10 ScIENTIsT & CITIZEN, Sept. 1968, at
165.
7 CBW CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, supra note 1, at 48.
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Union, and explores the legal and ethical problems surrounding
CBW. It is well written and very significant, for CBW agents do
not lend themselves to controlled application and their very exist-
ence is intolerable. When nerve gas escaped from the Dugway
Proving Ground in Utah thousands of sheep died; they could have
just as easily been humans.8
Other writers have warned of the dangers of these weapons.
Seymour Hersh and Richard McCarthy both have recently produced
books on the subject. The alarm is being sounded. President
Nixon's policy change is most welcome, and hopefully meaningful
disarmament will follow. How can a nation justify spending
$600,000 to study the use of birds for spreading disease?"0 What
kind of subhuman university faculty member can accept such money?
A study of this subject forces one to conclude that a substantial
amount of our national policy is formulated by cretins whose code
is overkill.
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8 Brodine, Gasper & Pallman, The Wind From Dugway, 11 ENVIRONMENT, Jan.-
Feb. 1969, at 2.
9 S. HERSH, CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: AMERICA'S HIDDEN ARSENAL
(1969); R. MCCARTHY, THE ULTIMATE FOLLY: WAR BY PESTILENCE, ASPHYXIA-
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10 The Pentagon signed a $600,000 contract with the University of Mississippi the
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